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Hatch, Thom Glorious War: The Civil War Adventures of George Armstrong
Custer. St. Martin’s Press, $28.99 ISBN 978-1-250-02850-1
Custer Before Little Big Horn
Thom Hatch is the author of several works focused on the history of the
American west and aimed at a popular audience. His most recent offering,
Glorious War: The Civil War Adventures of George Armstrong Custer, seeks to
rehabilitate Custer’s reputation as a military commander based on his service as
a cavalry officer in the American Civil War, a view based largely on what Hatch
maintains was Custer’s critical role in the Union victory at the Battle of
Gettysburg.
Beginning with Custer’s admission to West Point in 1857, Hatch relates the
story of his early military career and personal life, from his service with the
Second U.S. Cavalry at Bull Run through his rise to command of the Third
Cavalry Division by Appomattox. Hatch seems to be primarily a storyteller who
seeks to entertain his audience with a stirring yarn of military glory in days
passed; at the very least, that is the type of work he has crafted. His desire to spin
a tale rather than inform, however, deprives his book of a proper focus. At times
he relates military operations in which Custer did not participate, such as Shiloh,
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Vicksburg, and William T. Sherman’s March
to the Sea. He also recounts the activities of men with whom Custer had been
friends at West Point, even when their activities had little do with Custer’s Civil
War, and he devotes extensive space to the Confederate cavalry under J. E. B.
Stuart, setting aside nearly three full pages to detail Stuart’s final hours. The
space devoted to Custer’s personal life also seems out of place in a work that
reassesses his leadership capabilities. Moreover, Hatch’s concern for a good
story also leads him to provide a highly romanticized depiction of Civil War
combat, one that is (as his title indicates) “glorious," with heroic soldiers boldly
following their courageous leaders no matter the cost. This romanticized
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perspective may result from an over-reliance on post-war memoirs, but Hatch
allows it to color his interpretations. He concludes in an epilogue, for instance,
that the later debacle at the Little Bighorn was the fault of the soldiers who were
no longer willing to “follow their commander blindly . . . regardless of risk"
(307). These issues that derive from the author’s focus on a good story, however,
are only minor ones.
There are also major interpretive concerns. Despite modern scholarship on
Philip Sheridan’s 1864 Shenandoah campaign, such as Mark Neely’s The Civil
War and the Limits of Destruction (Harvard University Press, 2007), Hatch
paints this operation as one of total warfare, targeting all civilians in the valley
with “a systematic reign of terror" (280). The author also depicts the
Emancipation Proclamation as establishing “another goal to attain in this conflict
of states’ rights," as if slavery and the war were utterly unrelated until September
1862 (78). Most egregious of all is Hatch’s treatment of Gettysburg, which is
central to his attempt to rehabilitate Custer’s military reputation. He argues that
Robert E. Lee’s plan to attack the Union center on July 3 was a brilliant design
in which the Confederate cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart was supposed to play a
crucial part. According to Hatch, the Confederate troopers would “wade into the
Union rear in coordination with Pickett’s charge… and create mass confusion as
well as weakening the [Union] line by killing as many [men] as possible and
drawing away the enemy to fight the cavalry" (139). This is not a new
interpretation in popular histories of the war; Tom Carhart offered a similar view
in Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg--And Why It Failed (G. P.
Putam’s Sons, 2005), a book that Hatch lists in his bibliography but, curiously,
does not cite in his discussion of Gettysburg. This view of the third day of the
Pennsylvania battle, however, has been rejected by historians for a lack of solid
evidence.1 To support this contention, Hatch cites and quotes J. E. B. Stuart’s
report of the battle, noting that “Stuart’s mission was without a doubt . . . ‘to
effect a surprise on the enemy’s rear’" (152). This seems to be a stretch since
Stuart reported only that he “hoped to effect a surprise on the enemy’s rear," not
that he had orders to do so, and in fact, Lee’s report of the Gettysburg campaign
makes no mention at all of a planned cavalry assault on the Union rear in
coordination with Pickett’s ill-fated charge. It seems that Hatch merely adopts
this view of Gettysburg because if true, it would elevate Custer’s actions in
stopping Stuart’s advance to a critical component of the Union victory at
Gettysburg.2
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Hatch’s uncritical acceptance of an unproven theory about the role of
Confederate cavalry at Gettysburg in order to magnify the significance of his
particular subject is only one of many instances that mark this book as
hagiography rather than biography. Quite simply, Custer could do no wrong and
was central to ultimate Union victory in the war. For instance, Hatch claims that
Philip Sheridan’s 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign, in which Custer
commanded a cavalry division, “all but guaranteed Lincoln’s reelection," though
Hatch does not credit the fall of Atlanta or the capture of Mobile Bay for
contributing to Lincoln’s victory (285). Similarly, while Custer’s role in the war
is magnified, his failings are glossed over. When his official reports differed
from those of others, Hatch concludes that “Custer cannot be blamed for perhaps
embellishing his role" to impress the young woman he was courting (102). And
when Custer ignored orders to rest his men and instead set out on his own
authority to capture four Confederate supply trains at Appomattox Station, Hatch
concludes that the supply trains “naturally took precedence" over Custer’s orders
(298).
A final problem with Glorious War is Hatch’s use of sources. Most of his
secondary sources are popular histories, while he neglects much of the rich
academic scholarship on the Civil War. At the same time, his primary materials
are skewed towards post-war writings that were produced long after the
immediacy of the events that they described had passed. While he employs the
Official Records and makes light use of a few collections of contemporary
papers by Custer or people favorably disposed to him, this may not be enough to
offset the memoir literature that is likely responsible for his overly-romanticized
depiction of Civil War combat.
Overall there is little that is new or worthy of attention in Hatch’s
examination of Custer’s Civil War career. If anything this work is a reminder to
professionally-trained historians to make a greater effort to write for a wider
public. If instead we continue to write highly specialized studies for our own
consumption, works such as the one under review will continue to appear in
order to fulfill the public’s desire for accessible histories on popular topics,
leaving the historical profession with little influence on popular perceptions of
the past.
Mark A. Smith is an associate professor of history at Fort Valley State
University in central Georgia. His book, Engineering Security: The Corps of
Engineers and Third System Defense Policy, 1815-1861 (University of Alabama
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Press, 2009), examines the national defense policy developed and implemented
by the Corps of Engineers between the War of 1812 and the Civil War. He is
currently working on a study of the political activities of officers in the
antebellum Corps of Engineers.
---------------------------------------------1

John D. Foster, Review of Retreat from Gettysburg by Kent Masterson
Brown and Lost Triumph by Tom Carhart, Journal of Southern History 72, no. 3
(August 2006), 678-79; Brian Holden Reid, Review of Lost Triumph by Tom
Carhart, Journal of Military History 71, no. 1 (January 2007), 228-29. See also
Allen C. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion (New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
2013), 376; Emory M. Thomas, “Eggs, Aldie, Sheperdstown, and J. E. B.
Stuart," in The Gettysburg Nobody Knows, ed. Gabor S. Boritt (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 111-14.
2

J. E. B. Stuart to R. H. Chilton, 20 August 1863, in O.R., series 1, vol. 27,
part 2, 697 (emphasis added); R. E. Lee to S. Cooper, __ January 1864, in O.R.,
series 1, vol. 27, part 2, 320-21.

https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol16/iss2/15
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.16.2.16

4

